Domain parameters in the Schnorr identification scheme

I have been recently studying the Schnorr identification scheme. The book Cryptography: Theory and Practice by Stinson and Paterson states the following about the domain parameters in the Schnorr identification scheme:

The scheme requires a trusted authority, or TA, who chooses some common system parameters (domain parameters) for the scheme, as follows:

1. $p$ is a large prime (i.e., $p\approx 2^{2048}$).

2. $q$ is a large prime divisor of $p-1$ (i.e., $q\approx 2^{224}$).

3. $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ has order $q$

4. $t$ is a security parameter such that $q>2^t$. (A security parameter is a parameter whose value can be chosen in order to provide a desired level of security in a given scheme. Here, the adversary's probability of deceiving Alice or Bob is $2^{-t}$, so $t=80$ will provide adequate security for most practical applications.)

My question is, how can we find such $p$, $q$, $\alpha$ and $t$? And why does it have to be $p\approx 2^{2048}$, $q\approx 2^{224}$ and $t=80$?

We will need an efficient primality test to produce $p$ and $q$. If you're happy with probable primes then the Miller-Rabin test will suffice for most practical purposes. Write IsPrime() for the test.

Firstly choose $t$ according to the security requirements of your scheme. There's a chance of $2^{-t}$ that a deceiver can subvert the scheme at random, so a choosing $t=80$ means that even if your attacker tried to spoof your system at random $2^{80}$ times they would on average only succeed once. Allowing an adversary $2^{80}$ attempts to spoof your system is unlikely to be a realistic proposition, so $t=80$ is considered fine in this regard.

We now find $q$, it should be large enough that an adversary cannot solve discrete logarithms in an arbitrary group of $q$ elements (e.g. using the baby-step-giant-step method) and also larger that $2^t$. If $q\approx 2^{224}$ then approximately $2^{112}$ group operations would be required by the method and so at least $2^{112}$ computational operations would be needed for BS-GS. To find 224-bit $q$ generate a random 223-bit number $n$ and let $q_0=2^{223}+n$. Compute IsPrime($q_0$) and if successful let $q=q_0$ otherwise increment $q_0$ by 1 and repeat until we are successful.

We now find $p$, it should be large enough that an adversary cannot solve discrete logarithms modulo $p$ (e.g. using the number field sieve). If $p\approx 2^{2048}$ NIST guidelines suggest that at least $2^{112}$ computational operations would be required. To find 2048-bit $p$, generate a random 1824-bit number $m$ and let $p_0=q(2^{1824}+m)$. Compute IsPrime($p_0$) and if successful let $p=p_0$ otherwise increment $p_0$ by $q$ and repeat until we are successful.

We now find $\alpha$. Let $r=(p-1)/q$ note that $r$ is an integer. Start with $g=2$. Compute $\alpha_0\equiv g^r\pmod p$, if $\alpha_0\not\equiv 1\pmod p$ take $\alpha=\alpha_0$, otherwise increment $g$ by 1 and repeat until successful.

The parameters are chosen to provide 112-bits of classical computational security, other parameters would provide different levels of security e.g. $q\approx 2^{160}$ and $p\approx 2^{1024}$ would provide about 80-bits of classical computational security and $q\approx 2^{256}$ and $p\approx 2^{3072}$ would provide about 128-bits of classical computational security.