It is not clear to me (without seeing your code) what your current issue is.
Glancing through the paper, I see (for example in fig. 1):

(arbitrary objects) $c_1,\dots, c_v$ and $s_1,\dots, s_v$

*hashes* of these objects, which are written $hc_i = H(c_i)$ and $hs_i = H(s_i)$ (up to a permutation applied to the $s_i$).

All of the remaining operations are in terms of the $hc_i$ and $hs_i$, which appear to be (from context) in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, i.e. the arithmetic is standard (although it is likely that you have to choose $p$ large enough such that the discrete logarithm problem is hard, so of $\gg 1000$ bits. In particular you likely should be using bigints rather than u64's.
I haven't read closely enough that I know that they're assuming hardness of a DL-type assumption in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ though).

Scanning through the other figures, I see a similar story, namely that all arithmetic is done on hashed elements of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, rather than arbitrary bytestrings in $\{0,1\}^*$.
I don't see your particular example:

$$1≤i≤v:a_i'=(a_i)^{R′_s}$$

as being an issue. For example, this seems to occur in figure 4, where prior to it I see $a_i = (hs_i)^{R_s'}$.
In this figure I don't see the definition $hs_i = H(s_i)$, and I am only skimming, but it is plausible that this interpretation is being assumed, i.e. $hs_i$ is the *hash* of an arbitrary bytestring $s_i$, and is contained in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ (rather than $\{0,1\}^*$).

The general answer to

Do I simply perform this same operation for every byte in the field?

is going to be "no" (unless something specifically says to do this). Typically cryptographic protocols work on well-defined mathematical objects (say bit strings in $\{0,1\}^*$), and "chopping these up" to try to force things to work (when this is not specified as part of the protocol) can easily lead to security issues.