Score:1

Proof that exchanged variable was not modified with MITM

es flag

If I understand correctly, the core of man in the middle attack is in being able to replace an exchanged variable (public key) with another.

Hence to detect a MITM one needs to check if the exchanged public key is truly same for both A and B, and to defend against MITM one needs to be able to exchange a variable without it being modified.

I'd imagine it should be possible to detect a change in variable by using it to determine future information exchange rules (for example data order, or size of packets) for A and B, where next packet can only be sent once a response arrived. This way, the MITM would be forced to create (believable)replies to allow data exchange to continue. The MITM naturally desires to gather information from the exchange, and hence does not know the best possible replies. Also, as communication progresses, the divergence in exchanged information grows and hence becomes more visible (not sure how? Sanity checks?). This way it should be possible to detect MITM.

Am I correct or is there a flaw in my reasoning?

Manish Adhikari avatar
us flag
Why all this fuss, which gives barely any defense from an algorithm which should be easily able to gather and quickly generate believable false response, when a much better option of using freely available standards like TLS or signal protocol already does a much better job
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