I am looking to encrypt this string with a public key where the resulting message is < 64 characters.
Actually, it appears you can, if you trim back the security just a little bit.
One approach would be to use ECIES with, say, P-192. (EC-Elgamal would also be workable - I think this is a superior approach)
In this scheme, the private key is a random value $r$, and the public key is a value $P = rG$, where $G$ is the generator point. To encrypt, we pick a random value $s$, and compute both $sG$ and $sP$; we send the point $sP$ (or, in your case, just the x coordinate) through a Key Derivation Function, which generates a key that we use to encrypt the actual message. The ciphertext consists of the value $sG$ (in your case, just the x coordinate) and the symmetric encryption.
Now, if we use the curve P-192, the x-coordinate of $sG$ can be expressed in 192 bits; using the alphabet we've been given (which has 81 symbols), that would take 31 characters (for example, by converting the value from 0 to circa $2^{192}$ into base 81).
As for the symmetric encryption of the message, we can use a Format Preserving Encryption method [1]; this can convert a message consisting of an alphabet of 81 symbols into a ciphertext of the same alphabet and length.
So, an encryption of 31 symbols (the largest you said you're interested in) would encrypt as a message of 31+31 = 62 symbols - within your requirements.
The security costs:
P-192 has "96 bit security"; that's somewhat less than we normally use - however, it's still pretty good.
We do leak the length of the message (because the Format Preserving Encryption method preserves the length); if that is an additional requirement, you can always pad the message to 32 bytes (with the last character indicating the actual length of the message) - with this, we still meet the length requirement
[1]: Normally, with ECIES, we use an explicit integrity transform in the symmetric encryption. I would argue that's not needed in this case - any modification of the FPE would decrypt as something random, and the adversary can always replace the ciphertext with something that decrypts to something random (by the simple expedient of picking a random plaintext, and encrypting it with the public key).