Could this be a secure multiparty secret sharing scheme?

Suppose that $y$ is a uniform random variable that is defined over the field (or group or abelian group) $Y$. Let us suppose that there are $N=\{1,2,\cdots,i\cdots,N\}$ agents and only one of them, say $i$, knows the random variable $y$. She wants to share the secret with the other $|N|-1$ players. So we could assume that player $i$ could find $x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_{K}$, where $K=|N|-1$, i.i.d uniform random variables over the space $Y$ and $a_1,a_2,...,a_k$ non_zero constants such that the $$\sum_{j\neq i}^Na_jx_j=y?$$

So every player $j=-i$ would know the part a_jx_j and only if all of them make a cross communication and calculate $a_1x_1\oplus_Ya_2x_2\oplus_Y\cdots\oplus_Ya_kx_k$ then all together will learn $y$. Could this be a secret sharing scheme, where the uniform random variable $Y$ could be written as a linear combination of a family of i.i.d. uniform random vectors that also belong to $Y$?

If my idea is not how could someone enrich it so as to become complete and a multiparty computation will need to be applied so as the players would obtain the secret $y$ only if they contribute all of them their private information that they got from the agent $i$?

What could be the weakness of such a scheme and how could we confront it? Does this have bounds?

P.S. i dont know if it is necessary to write the calculation in the following way

$$(a_1\otimes_Yx_1)\oplus_Y(a_2\otimes_Yx_2)\oplus_Y\cdots\oplus_Y(a_k\otimes_Yx_k)$$

Have you looked at Shamir secret sharing?

For your case, it seems like all $K$ players are required to reconstruct $y$. I think this is true because if a single player $j$ decides not to share their value $a_jx_j$, then the players would add up their values and get:

$$ \sum_{i\neq j,i=1}^K a_ix_i = y - a_jx_j$$

Since $a_jx_j$ is (hopefully) uniformly random, this gives them no information about $y$.

It looks like you've included player $i$, who knows the value $y$ directly, in the set of players. From the above, this means all players need to cooperate, including player $i$, to recover $y$. But if all players decide to cooperate, they don't need any secret shares, since player $i$ has the secret value. Instead of using a secret sharing scheme, player $i$ can send nothing at first, and then when they all agree to recover the secret value $y$, then player $i$ can just send everyone the value $y$.

Shamir secret sharing can give you a $t$-out-of-$K$ scheme, so that player $i$ can compute values $x_i$ to give to every player, such that if at least $t$ players cooperate, those players can compute values for $a_i$ so that the sum of $a_ix_i$ for all cooperating players will equal $y$.

Shamir secret sharing with $t=K$ looks very similar to what you've described, the only difference being that there is no $a_i$ and the $x_i$ are allowed to be $0$. For this scheme, you would choose uniformly random $x_i$ to for all $i$ except $i=K$. Then set

$$ x_K = y - \sum_{i=1}^{K-1}x_i$$

Then any set of $K-1$ secret values are uniformly random and independent of $y$, which basically the best security guarantee you can hope for.

From these values of $x_i$, if you want the scheme to resemble your original proposal, you could pick a random non-zero $x_i'$, and set $a_i = x_i'^{-1}x_i$. In fact, each player could do this themselves, so it will not change security. But I don't see what functionality it gives you.