I wouldn't assume that a difference in chosen FIPS 140-2 levels tells you anything at all about the relative security of two systems.
FIPS 140-2 validation is controversial in the cryptography community. Generally people only implement it if they want to sell to U.S. Government customers who are required by law to comply with it.
Critics would say that FIPS 140-2 at best is redundant with modern security analysis, and at worst it actively harms security by making it more difficult to fix bugs or refactor cryptography libraries with improvements. (Any changes trigger revalidation, which costs time and money.)
From Matthew Green, a cryptographer at Johns Hopkins:
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/01/02/openssl-and-nss-are-fips-140-certified/
Now, to be fair, nobody in either the OpenSSL project or Mozilla is claiming that FIPS compliance makes these libraries magically secure. I’m sure they not only know better, but they curse FIPS privately behind closed doors because it requires a whole lot of extra code in exchange for a dubious security benefit.
From Darren Moffat, who worked on implementing FIPS 140-2 validation for Solaris:
https://blogs.oracle.com/solaris/post/is-fips-140-2-actively-harmful-to-software
So should I run Solaris 11 with FIPS 140-2 mode enabled ?
My personal opinion is that unless you have a very hard requirement to do so I wouldn't...