These days I found myself thinking about the implications of padding or not padding block cipher modes that act like additive stream ciphers (I meant OFB, CTR, GCM etc). Let's call additive modes.
You know, people hooked on crypto tends to be I little bit paranoid... Well, at some point of my ruminations about the pros and cons of padding when using those additive modes, maybe I got found a "cons" that let me a bit intrigated: maybe not padding the cryptogram will offer a shortcut for the cryptoanalyst on excluding all other non additive modes during a brute force or even during any other more sophisticated cryptoanalysis.
Since modern ciphers are constructed in a way that any cryptogram will look like random data. If it was encrypted by using CBC or GCM, in practice, the picked mode will not be recognizable by any statistical or other method if cryptogram was a multiple of the cipher blocksize, right?
My doubt about it is if this aleged "operation mode leaking", in state of art, would be considered a weak point in the whole cryptographic infrastructure. Since cryptographers and cryptoanalysts has a endless fight, if a cryptographer is able to do not provide shortcuts for the cryptoanalyst, would not it be better avoid providing any shortcut for the cryptoanalysis? Let's forget a little Kerckhoffs's principle. Even better, if you can keep secret the key, why not also keep the operation mode in doubt?
Sorry if it sounds a little crazy or paranoid question but I am sure that here will be the only place at the Internet where I could be able to find "paranoids" worried about those more philosophical crypto questions ;)
Thanks in advance!