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Is there a cryptography primitive for public/private keys such that only keys from a predefined set will be valid

us flag

I am trying to accomplish the following:

  • $Alice$ is an authority that can provide a secret $x$ to $Bob$, $x$ will enable $Bob$ to generate a public/private key pair $(p,q)$ which he can then use to sign messages. $Alice$ will not be able to sign messages as $Bob$.

  • Anyone can trivially verify that the public key $Bob$ used was authorized by $Alice$.

My initial thought is that one could implement a rough version of this by requiring $Bob$ to submit his public key to $Alice$ then collect a digital signature on the public key which is then included as an addendum to his public key. The only problem is that now $Alice$ knows $Bob$'s public key.

Daniel S avatar
ru flag
You've just described how certifying authorities work in such protocols as TLS. Why is it a problem if Alice knows Bob's public key? This still does not allow Alice to sign messages as Bob (which would require Bob's private key).
poncho avatar
my flag
If it's an issue that Alice knows Bob's public key, well, Alice to do a blind signature of Bob's public key...
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