Score:2

For the given construction not all secure PRG gives a secure PRG

gb flag

Let $G:\{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}^m$ be a PRG. We define another PRG $G_0 : \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}^m$ as follows: $G_0(s) = G(s) \oplus (0^{m−n}\mathbin\|s)$. Can there exists a secure PRG $G$ for which $G_0$ is insecure?

The question asks me to prove that such a PRG exists. But I am not sure how. Primarily I was thinking if the PRG $G$ keeps last $m-n$ bits of its output constant, the $G_0$ will not be secure. But in such case $G$ is not secure as well, when $m-n > 1$. Can someone please give me any hint on this problem? Thank you.

fgrieu avatar
ng flag
Perhaps a counterexample $G$ can be built as a Feistel/Luby–Rackoff cipher with key $s$ applied to a constant, and crafted such that the $\oplus (0^{m−n}\mathbin\|s)$ undoes the last round.
cn flag
Remember that it's perfectly fine for a PRG to output part of the seed in plain, as long as it's not otherwise used.
Megha avatar
gb flag
@fgrieu - I could not catch your hint properly. In $\oplus (0^{m-n}||s)$, s is the seed of the PRG. If I take the Luby-Rackoff cipher with key s, as the PRG G, then the seed s in the XOR is not same as the key of the PRP. Then how can this XOR undo the last round?
Megha avatar
gb flag
@Maeher - I have one thing to be clarified. A PRG can remain secure even if it outputs a part of the seed in plaintext. But if it outputs the entire seed in plaintext, then it is not secure - right? Because in that case, the seed can be stripped off and G can be calculated on that. Thereby it can be distinguished from a TRG with probability 1. Am I correct?
cn flag
Yes, that is correct.
Geoffroy Couteau avatar
cn flag
You do not need to output the full seed as part of the PRG output to build a counter-example: in fact, adding a single bit of the seed to the output suffices to get a counter example. I'll let you work out the details :)
Megha avatar
gb flag
Thanks for all the hints. I have solved the problem.
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