LWE Encryption Scheme by Regev is inefficient due to its public key sizes in $O(n^2)$. This led to the variant problem RLWE, defined in this paper :
Let $n$ be a power of two, and q a prime satisfying $q = 1 \mod 2n$. We define $R_q = (\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})[X] / (X^N+1)$, which is the polynomials with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z}$ considered modulus $X^N+1$ ($X^N = -1$). We choose $s \in R_q$ our secret, and $\chi_{R_q}$ an error distribution. A sample from the LWE distribution is :
$$ (a,b) = (a, a\cdot s + e) $$
with $a \overset{\\\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{U}(R_q)$ and $e \overset{\\\$}{\leftarrow} \chi_{R_q}$.
In the same paper, the RLWE-based encryption has $(a,b)$ as a public key, and the encryption for $m \in \{0,1\}^n$ is $c=(u,v)$ with :
$$ u = a \cdot r + e_1 \mod q \qquad v = b \cdot r + e_2 + \lfloor q/2 \rfloor m \mod q $$
with $r$ chosen randomly in $R_q$ and $e_1,e_2$ errors in $R_q$.
However, I've seen in various papers, like this one, that the advantage comes from choosing a single sample $A_1 = (a_1,\cdots,a_n)$ and construct the other vectors $A_i = (a_i,\cdots,a_n,-a_1,\cdots,-a_{i-1})$ because we only need to store $A_1$, so the key size is $O(n)$. I don't see what role these vectors $(A_i)_{2 \leq i \leq n}$ play in the encryption considering that it seems we only need $a$.