Score:1

Is it appropriate to prohibit an adversary from querying a specific input in an algorithm in some situation?

co flag

There are two algorithms in my framework, $E_1(\cdot)$ and $E_2(\cdot)$.

In particular, executing $E_1(\cdot)$ on a specific input $x$ (i.e., $E_1(x)$) is equivalent to executing $E_2(y)$ for some input $y$.

Suppose the security model of this framework allows an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ to query $E_1(\cdot)$ with any input, and resists $\mathcal{A}$ from querying $E_2(\cdot)$ algorithm.

Can I prevent the adversary from querying $E_1(x)$ in my security proof?

kodlu avatar
sa flag
What is $B$? Explain
Zi-Yuan Liu avatar
co flag
@kodlu sorry, I have edited it
Score:1
ru flag

You can certainly define a security model that prohibits certain inputs. For example the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack model (e.g. IND-CCA2) only allows an adversary to submit inputs to the decryption function that are not equal to the challenge ciphertext.

This says nothing about how useful such a model is in terms of approximating adversary capability.

Zi-Yuan Liu avatar
co flag
Thank you. However, such input value is defined during performing E_1 algorithm (a randomness). In other words, I can't define it in the security model
Daniel S avatar
ru flag
If the input is randomised, then you should be able to make an argument that the adversary evaluating $E_1(x)$ is vanishingly unlikely (if it isn't than there probably is an attack).
Zi-Yuan Liu avatar
co flag
Ok I understood Thank you
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