$\newcommand{FP}{\mathbb F_p}$
The authenticator built on Poly1305 follows a generic construction to build MAC from a universal hash and a pseudo-random function. So, increasing the field size and hence output size (assumedly for security) is possible, in theory at least. Poly1305 precisely refers to the universal hash part of the construction. Which itself is a polynomial evaluation hash that can be generically defined over any field $\FP$. The actual details of Poly1305 are somewhat more complicated. But the point is that this construction yields an excellent Difference-Unpredictable Hash.
The “issue” comes from turning such a hash into a MAC, especially when $p$ is a prime. In the purest version of the MAC scheme, we would simply have a PRF generating values in $\FP$. However, the most practical and efficient PRFs, including AES that is commonly used with Poly1305, produce $n$-bit strings instead. Leaving us with two options for how big $p$ should be: 1) either slightly larger than $2^n$ or 2) slightly smaller. Poly1305 makes the first choice, which offers one big advantage: The message can be broken up and processed in $n$-bit blocks. With the second option, we would need to process inputs as field elements. Which is inconvenient if $p$ is prime. Again, the actual implementation details are likely to be more involved than this.
Finally, increasing the field size would require adjusting the PRF size accordingly. Otherwise, there might not be significant security gains. Which means that we would also need a performant PRF with bigger output space.