Anything can become a candidate for post-quantum cryptography if there has been sufficient cryptanalytic interest in it for long enough that practitioners believe it is plausibly hard to break for both pre-and-post quantum computers.
What "sufficient interest" for "long enough" is very nebulous though.
If you follow discussions on the PQC forum, some well-known cryptanalysts will get quite annoyed that lattices
- were of niche research interest for perhaps 10 years [say 95-2007]
- specialized interest for 10 [say 2007-2015]
- generalized interest for 8 years [say 2015-2023]
before being chosen for standardized. This timeline is sometimes seen as being too aggressive.
For a faster timeline, you could think of Isogeny-based crypto (though I am not qualified to break it down in the above way).
By whatever measure, it was a more niche research area than lattices, and ended up suffering a devestating attack some (almost) 2 decades after first being proposed.
The key technical result of this attack (Kani's theorem) was even published before the first isogeny-based cryptosystem was developed, yet it still took those ~20 years for a real cryptanalytic test to occur.
Perhaps with enough research interest tropical cryptography may have merits. But it is much too early to say anything, given that an average practicing cryptographer has a decent chance of never having heard of it before (such as myself), so it perhaps has not been sufficiently exposed to cryptanalysis.